Gender, Visibility and Public Space in Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexual Orientation by Millbank, Jenni
Seattle Journal for Social Justice 
Volume 1 Issue 3 Article 61 
December 2002 
Gender, Visibility and Public Space in Refugee Claims on the Basis 
of Sexual Orientation 
Jenni Millbank 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj 
Recommended Citation 
Millbank, Jenni (2002) "Gender, Visibility and Public Space in Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexual 
Orientation," Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 1 : Iss. 3 , Article 61. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol1/iss3/61 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice 
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
 725 
Gender, Visibility and Public Space in Refugee 
Claims on the Basis of Sexual Orientation 
Jenni Millbank1 
In recent years, many Western refugee-receiving countries have accepted 
that lesbians and gay men may be eligible refugee claimants through the 
“membership of a particular social group” category of the Refugees 
Convention.2  Key receiving nations such as Germany,3 the USA,4 and 
Canada5 in the late 1980s and early 1990s accepted that lesbians and gay 
men might belong to a particular social group.6  Australia followed suit in 
19947 and the UK, after many conflicting decisions, accepted eligibility 
only in 1999.8  In 2002, the European Parliament voted to broaden the draft 
European Commission Directive on the definition of a refugee to explicitly 
include sexual orientation, gender identity and HIV status as elements of the 
particular social group category.9  
However, eligibility to bring a claim is only the first step in the refugee 
determination process.  Although the definition of refugee is universal and 
the elements of the decisions on particular social group claims based on 
sexual orientation are apparently straightforward (are lesbians and gay men 
a particular social group in the sending country?10 is the person lesbian or 
gay? are they, or will they be, in danger of persecution on that basis?), the 
manner in which these questions are asked and answered is deeply inflected 
with gendered notions of the public and the private.  The case law is full of 
gendered and sexualised assumptions about identity and public space that 
demand close analysis and critique. 
In our comparative study of refugee decisions on sexuality from Canada 
and Australia11 we found a stark contrast between lesbians trapped in their 
homes, persecuted by their families, and gay men entrapped in parks and 
toilets, persecuted by the police.  Lesbians had great difficulty grounding 
their claims, as their experiences were “too private,” while the experiences 
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of gay men were often characterised as “too public.”  Our initial sense was 
that lesbians and gay men occupied quite separate, gendered realms, with 
little to connect them.  However, there was a clear theme across the cases: 
the “proper place” of both lesbian and gay sexual identity was in the private 
domain.  Gay and lesbian presence in the public domain was repeatedly 
characterised as one of transgression.  There echoed a profound disapproval 
of publicly declared gay or lesbian identity, both in the sending countries 
and in the Australian decisions.  This exclusion from the public transcended 
gender and coalesced around the theme of visibility.  It is through an 
analysis of the links between visibility and violence that I am drawn to 
argue that a feminist-centred refugee jurisprudence must recognise and 
respect sexual self-determination on the part of lesbian and gay asylum 
seekers.   
The latter part of this paper makes a feminist argument for the protection 
of public gay sex by linking it to the overarching issue of sexual self-
determination, which concerns both lesbians and gay men in the site of 
refugee jurisprudence.  This analysis connects decision-makers’ policing of 
public expression with the continual process of bodily self-management and 
self-surveillance that lesbians and gay men undergo as part of their daily 
lives. 
PRIVATE HOUSES 
Research on the gendered nature of homophobic violence in Western 
receiving countries has documented that lesbians face significantly more 
private violence than gay men—they are more likely to be harassed and 
assaulted at home or at work rather than on the streets, and are more likely 
to be attacked by men known to them, such as neighbours or former 
partners.12  Lesbians are also more likely than gay men to face sexual or 
sexualised forms of assault.13  In this way, violence against lesbians 
demonstrates some similarities to violence against heterosexual women.  
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Much feminist refugee literature has explored the difficulties that women 
(who are presumably heterosexual)14 experience in asylum claims.15  The 
domestic or semi-private nature of the persecution of women, the use of 
sexual assault as a method of persecution and the difficulty of establishing a 
state nexus (for example, in situations of state indifference to domestic 
violence or rape) have been continuing themes in refugee claims by women 
in general.  These factors were strongly present in the lesbian cases we 
analysed.  
Lesbian claimants were remarkable firstly for their absence from refugee 
cases.16  When lesbians did appear, they often failed to receive asylum, with 
an overall success rate that was considerably lower than that of men.  
However, this overall figure masked a sharp disparity: in Canada, lesbian 
claimants actually had a slightly higher success rate than gay men17 while in 
Australia lesbian claimants were overwhelmingly unsuccessful.18 
In the Australian tribunal, lesbian applicants frequently failed because 
their experience was characterised as “merely private.”  A stunning example 
concerns a 1999 claim by a lesbian from Bolivia.19  The claimant had been 
subject to violence, harassment and sexual assault by several men in her 
neighbourhood as a result of a male relative telling people that she was a 
lesbian, “because he hoped that if they all insulted and attacked her, she 
would change.”  The tribunal held that it was: 
…a purely private matter and…not exerted for reasons of the 
Applicant’s membership of a particular social group of 
homosexuals. There is no evidence to suggest that…other 
homosexuals were threatened or harmed by him or his 
associates…The tribunal accepts that although Bolivian society, 
and many other societies or communities generally disapprove of 
homosexuality, the Applicant’s relative’s motivation to ‘cure’ her 
of homosexuality is directed solely at the Applicant, a family 
relation.20 
The study found that the private had multiple impacts on lesbian asylum 
claims.  The experience of violence in the private realm made it difficult for 
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many lesbian claimants to satisfy the public state nexus component of the 
refugee definition.  In addition, decision-makers’ projected conceptions of 
appropriate gender norms meant that what was characterised as private was 
shifting and unpredictable.  Experiences that were arguably public (such as 
police harassment or failure to protect) and which ought to thereby satisfy 
the state nexus requirement, were re-construed as private in the sense that 
the experiences were viewed as individually motivated or as provoked by 
the lesbian applicant.21  It was not simply that lesbian experience did not fit 
the pre-existing mould demanded by refugee law; our analysis suggested a 
continually shifting public/private divide in which the public side was as 
perilous as the private.  
While the Canadian tribunal displayed considerable sensitivity to gender 
issues, the Australian tribunal rarely, if ever, appeared to consider the 
specific human rights of lesbian women.  The Australian tribunal frequently 
subsumed lesbian women under the implicitly heterosexual category of 
‘women’ or implicitly male category of ‘homosexual.’  Acknowledging and 
interrogating gender in lesbian refugee decisions is vital, as ignoring gender 
has systematically disadvantaged lesbian claimants.  Yet, alertness to 
gender in sexuality-based claims should not obscure the links that arise 
across gender.  These links revolve around the themes of choice, visibility 
and public space.  While the lesbian cases clearly did reflect gendered 
assumptions about women’s relationship to the private, they also reflected 
hetero-normative assumptions about queer sexuality as a sexualised rupture 
of the (natural) public order.  
PUBLIC TOILETS 
Male claimants in our study had both a much larger number of total 
claims and a higher rate of overall success in their claims than did women.  
In general, it was easier for gay men to make out the public aspects of their 
cases to establish a state nexus.  They were more likely than lesbians to 
have come to the notice of the police and to have been persecuted directly 
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or refused assistance by them.  However, gay men who experienced 
persecution as a result of their presence in gay cruising locales or ‘beats’—
such as parks, public toilets or other public or semi-public locations—were 
in danger of being characterised by decision-makers as the deserving 
objects of neutral criminal law because of their own sexual (or sexualised) 
transgressions.22  This approach is inexcusable.  There is an enormous range 
of information available on the discriminatory enforcement of  public order 
and public decency laws being used as a weapon of oppression against 
sexual minorities in a wide range of countries.23 
Only when the applicant’s conduct could be construed as a result of 
necessity rather than choice was protection offered in the Australian case 
law.  In a series of cases involving men who had been attacked on beats, 
decision-makers reasoned that if beats were the only available gay venue in 
the applicant’s locale, or the only anonymous (and therefore ‘safe’ or 
‘discreet’) option available, the applicant’s presence in the beats could be a 
legitimate expression of identity, and by extension a legitimate use of public 
space.24  Public identification, including sexual expression, short of actual 
sex, was thereby permissible in order to achieve sex in private.  In this line 
of decisions, beats were lifted from the public and re-configured as a step 
on the road to private sex.  As a result, beats were expressly protected 
because of their (real or imagined) proximity to the private.  The propriety 
of excluding (homo)sexuality from the public was perversely reinforced by 
the public sex cases, many of which juxtaposed the permitted innate need of 
secretly visiting beats with the impermissible public homosexual conduct or 
flaunting, which involved a choice.  The classic example of unacceptable 
homosexual choice was handholding in public.  
Just as positive decisions for gay men erased the public, they also tended 
to erase sexual agency or choice.  In an earlier article I posed several 
questions: Is it possible to articulate an expression of public sexuality in a 
human rights framework if it involves choice?25  Is it possible to discuss 
public gay sex as an expression of culture as well as individual identity and 
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sexuality?  And, is it possible to do so in a feminist manner?  At first blush, 
the role of public sex has little, if anything, to do with lesbian experience.  
Public sex, and most especially anonymous public sex, is very much a male 
experience and few lesbians are ever likely to emulate it.26  But, does the 
simple fact that lesbians are not (generally)27 having public sex enough to 
preclude its relevance to lesbians or to feminist analysis? 
I WANT TO HOLD YOUR HAND 
Refugee protection routinely attaches to sexuality only where it is, or is 
seen as, the result of necessity and not choice.  Applicants are protected 
because they cannot help being gay, and therefore cannot help being 
persecuted for being gay, because they cannot help expressing their gayness 
somehow.  The language of public visibility particularly marked the 
suppression of choice.  In the Australian decisions on sexuality, it was 
frequently repeated that there is no human right to publicly embrace, to 
flaunt, proclaim, parade or hold hands.28  Gail Mason has argued that the 
trope of visibility is “the crystallisation of assumptions that circulate in 
contemporary western nations regarding the appropriateness, or otherwise, 
of expressions and representations of homosexuality.”29  Mason continues: 
We need look no further than the popular and longstanding refrain 
against those who ‘flaunt’ their homosexuality to realise that the 
very suggestion that homosexuality can be flaunted is itself the 
product of the social and political hush that has historically 
enveloped the subject of same-sex sexuality.  Whilst the cultural 
mandate to conceal one’s homosexuality may have waned, the 
knowledge that it is possible to do so continues to serve as the 
favoured benchmark against which all representations of 
homosexuality are measured. (emphasis in original)30 
Although Mason’s work on homophobia-related violence is located in 
Australia, her argument that it is not possible to consider the full social 
implications of such violence in isolation from sexual visibility is apposite.  
The benchmark of invisibility makes it possible in the case law for decision-
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makers to produce such conundrums as a “thriving but discreet homosexual 
community” in Colombia where “homosexuality is practised freely in 
private” but “public displays…entail some risk.”31  The Australian decision-
makers’ expectations that homosexuality could and should be secret 
likewise enabled the paradoxical conclusion that a number of extremely 
repressive regimes, such as Iran, were “tolerant” of homosexuality (as long 
as it was kept completely invisible).32  
The Australian tribunal has issued divided decisions, expressing an 
ongoing conflict over whether applicants must be discreet in their home 
countries so as to avoid persecution.33  One third of Australian cases raised 
the issue of secrecy, or discretion, and one fifth expressly required it of 
applicants.  The tribunal expressed the discretion requirement as a 
“reasonable expectation that persons should, to the extent that it is possible, 
co-operate in their own protection.”34  This requirement effectively reverses 
the responsibility of a state to ensure protection from persecution and places 
the onus instead on the applicant.  
The deeply embedded hetero-normativity of such a requirement is well 
exposed in the tribunal’s own words: 
It is not an infringement of a fundamental human right if one is 
required, for safety’s sake, simply not to proclaim that sexuality 
openly.  Individuals of a variety of sexual orientations live side by 
side in a society like Ghana and practise their sexual orientations 
privately without feeling a need to proclaim these orientations to 
the general public.  The public manifestation of homosexuality is 
not an essential ingredient of being homosexual.35 
The Australian tribunal confined homosexual identity to homosexual sex, 
and as a corollary sexualised all manifestations of homosexual identity.  
Public sex, kisses in the park, and handholding on the street all became 
merged under the rubric of “sexual displays.”  While homosexuality was 
received as a display, a proclamation or a visual and sexual performance, 
heterosexuality disappeared into its own cultural cloak, and in the tribunal’s 
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understanding, was never public or performed.  Heterosexuality is so 
naturalised that, even as a pretence undertaken by closeted gay people in 
fear of their lives, it was still posited as normal.  In a 1998 case concerning 
a gay man from Sri Lanka, the tribunal wrote:   
The evidence is that he can avoid a real chance of serious harm 
simply by refraining from making his sexuality widely known - by 
not saying that he is homosexual and not engaging in public 
displays of affection towards other men.  He will be able to 
function as a normal member of society if he does this.  This does 
not seem to me to involve any infringement of fundamental human 
rights (emphasis added).36   
In its “discretion decisions,” the Australian tribunal expressly 
determined, and indeed policed, the boundaries of acceptable behaviour 
around a shifting public/private divide that centred on a concept of the 
visible.  In marked contrast, in the vast majority of Canadian cases, the 
Canadian tribunal did not impose a discretion requirement.  In 1995, the 
Immigration Review Board (IRB) rejected the “discretion” requirement in 
the strongest terms: 
There are many ways of ‘hiding.’  One can conceal oneself in a 
cave, or an attic, or a friend’s apartment.  One can also attempt to 
hide one’s race, religion, nationality or indeed any one of the 
attributes of the person which fall under Convention grounds—for 
example, by practising the official state religion in public and 
one’s own faith only in secret, or by carrying false identification 
and ‘passing’ for someone of another race or nationality. 
At the heart of the Convention definition of a refugee is the 
concept that no person should face a reasonable chance of 
persecution because of her or his race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group or political opinion.  To 
deny refugee status to someone who cannot or will not conceal one 
of these immutable or fundamental attributes, on the grounds that 
by such a concealment he or she could remove the fear of 
persecution, would make a mockery of the Convention. 37  
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In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the 
claim of a Mexican man who identified as gay but also sometimes cross-
dressed as a woman.  The applicant’s claim was rejected at the first hearing 
and again on appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  The BIA 
held that the way the applicant appeared in public was a choice, and that 
therefore his “mistreatment arose from his conduct.” (In the Australian 
parlance, he was a flaunter).  The Court of Appeals forcefully rejected the 
premise that the onus was on the applicant to avoid the persecution: 
Perhaps, then, by ‘conduct,’ the BIA was referring to 
Geovanni’s effeminate dress or his sexual orientation as a gay 
man, as a justification for the police officer’s raping him.  The ‘you 
asked for it’ excuse for rape is offensive to this court and has been 
discounted by courts and commentators alike.38 
The Canadian tribunal often explicitly credited applicants with the right 
to be publicly identified as gay or lesbian and connected being openly gay 
with concepts such as self-identity, self-respect and self-expression.  
However, visibility still arose as a major axis of understanding lesbian and 
gay experience in the Canadian decisions.  For instance, the Canadian 
tribunal was prepared to assume that applicants who were resolutely 
closeted would continue to live that way indefinitely and that such lack of 
visibility would eradicate or reduce their risk of persecution.  The tribunal 
would deny claims based on this assumption.39  Although applicants were 
not required to hide their sexuality, if it appeared that they would blend into 
the background, the Canadian tribunal was content to leave them there.40  
Eve Sedgwick has been much quoted on her claim that the closet is the 
defining metaphor of modern Western homosexuality.41  Sedgwick and 
many others have demonstrated that this metaphor is an ill-fitting one, 
expressing a dichotomous and essentialised understanding of both identity 
and visibility.42  In a recent UK case, a gay man from Pakistan explicitly 
argued that if refouled he would be in danger because he was an openly gay 
man.  The English tribunal, and the Court of the Queen’s Bench on appeal, 
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held that he was not really out because neither his work colleagues nor his 
family knew that he was gay.  Hence, they reasoned, being out was not 
accomplished and being closeted back in Pakistan was still a viable option 
(which they thus imposed upon him).43  In reality, one is never completely 
closeted or completely out, as if these are static, universal and opposing 
states.  Rather, the degree to which a lesbian expresses her sexual identity 
encompasses a continual process of choice on her part.  Moreover, the 
extent to which she is seen as a lesbian will depend upon the degree of 
surveillance to which she is subject, and upon the interpretative processes of 
those who are viewing her.  
While one may be able to maintain a closeted life in Jordan or 
Bangladesh for weeks, months or years, the state of closeted-ness is always 
a potentially permeable one.  An unconscious gesture, an inquisitive 
neighbour, a 20-year cohabitation with “a friend” or a change of heart 
render the state of closeted-ness always a potentially permeable one .  Many 
applicants, from countries as varied as Malaysia, India, Bangladesh and 
Iran, testified that to remain unmarried through adulthood would in and of 
itself be interpreted as evidence that they were homosexual and expose 
them to risk.  It is arguable that in such cultures even an applicant who 
desperately wishes to, and takes all possible steps to, remain closeted, in 
fact becomes increasingly visible with the passage of time.  Yet both 
tribunals were prepared to accept—to different degrees—the closet as a 
stable, safe and permanent home to applicants.  
Non-conformity is inextricably linked to the visible, as it is through being 
seen as different that the applicants were at risk.  To return to Gail Mason’s 
work on the experience of homophobia related violence, she explored the 
extent to which subjects “managed” their own visibility and negotiated 
public space by asking about held hands.  The question received a 
consistent, indeed overwhelming, response: “it depends.” 
[I]t depends on the atmosphere and terrain of each and every 
situation as it arises; it depends on the possible repercussions; it 
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depends on the short-term and long-term significance of any 
negative responses; it depends on staying attuned to the situation, 
and so on.  No one said, ‘I always feel safe enough to display such 
affection.’  No one said, ‘I never feel safe enough to display such 
affection.’  The decision to hold hands or kiss was always a 
question of weighing up the risks and rewards.44 
This process of weighing up the risks and rewards of visibility against a 
background of threatened or experienced violence is one undertaken 
constantly by lesbians and gay men.  These risks, wherever they occur in 
the world, are always a question of choice in the face of constraint.  The 
constraints vary, but my argument is that whether undertaken in China or 
Bangladesh, in a home, a hotel room, a public street or a public toilet, such 
choices about risk and visibility are the applicant’s, not the decision-
maker’s, to make.  
CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the role of the private in the lesbian domestic cases, the 
public sex aspect of the gay men’s cases and the discretion requirement that 
has so disadvantaged both lesbians and gay men, leads me at the very least 
to urge a rethink on the use of privacy rights or privacy discourse as a tool 
for lesbians and gay men in international law.  Wayne Morgan argues that 
privacy “cannot provide an analytic structure to theorise power,” and goes 
on to argue that as a legal tool it reinforces the “dangerousness of homosex” 
and disempowers lesbians and gay men by reifying the view that queer 
sexuality has “no acceptable public face.”45  
A sense of ensnarement in a perilous public/private divide makes me 
greatly reluctant to use any concept of the private in defending lesbian and 
gay subjects, and makes me equally wary of abandoning gay men who are 
too public in their sexual choices.  Moreover, many queer activists and 
theorists have warned against gaining inclusion for some good lesbians or 
gay men at the cost of producing outsiders.46  
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Kris Walker and Wayne Morgan have both proposed the concept of 
sexual self-determination in international law and argued that this concept 
embodies more than “a simple assertion of a right to liberty.”47  Walker 
argues that this is a transformative project, not limited to formal equality or 
privacy claims.  Her argument is that “[r]ather than merely seeking an 
absence of state regulation of behaviour, sexual self-determination also 
seeks to achieve the conditions under which individuals can make choices 
about their sexuality.”48  This concept may well be a workable one to 
address the concerns outlined in this paper where choices about visibility 
and sexual agency were routinely denied both by persecutory regimes and 
by decision-makers, particularly those in Australia. 
In this paper I have focused upon agency and visibility as key concepts in 
refugee law on sexuality.  I argue that feminist-centred, or feminist-aware, 
refugee jurisprudence must protect lesbians and gay men as sexual subjects.  
In doing so, laws and processes must respect lesbian and gay choices and 
offer protection when, where, and if they choose to take chances. 
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